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PROCEDURE-CONFESSIONS-WAIVER

OF
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TO INFORM

SUSPECT OF ATrORNEY'S

ATTEMPT TO CONTACT

HiM-Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
Recognition of the inherently intimidating atmosphere of instation police interrogation prompted the United States Supreme
Court, in Miranda v. Arizona,' to establish rules designed to protect a suspect's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.2 These guidelines require that police officers, prior to
questioning a suspect in custody, inform him of his right to remain silent and his right to have a lawyer present during questioning.3 The Miranda Court emphasized that a suspect's waiver
of these rights would be legitimate only if "knowingly and intelligently made."' In Moran v. Burbine,5 the Supreme Court restricted the scope of Miranda by upholding the admissibility of a
confession made after a suspect in custody waived his rights, unaware that an attorney had attempted to contact him.6
On June 29, 1977, at approximately 3:00 p.m., the Cranston,
Rhode Island police arrested Brian Burbine along with two other
suspects, DiOrio and Sparks. 7 Upon arrival at the Cranston Police Headquarters, the three were charged with breaking and entering and then were placed in separate rooms. 8 A Cranston
police detective, Ferranti, quickly realized that Burbine's address
matched the address disclosed by an informant who had provided information regarding the murder of a woman in Providence, Rhode Island.9 Suspicious that Burbine was responsible
1 384

U.S. 436 (1966).

2 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part that "[n]o person shall be
... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...."
3 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. The Miranda Court stated that when an individual is

subject to custodial interrogation, the following warnings are required:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.

id.
4 Id. at 475.
5 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
6 Id. at 1140.
7 Id. at 1154 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 1138. Mary Jo Hickey was found in a parking lot in the city of Providence, Rhode Island on March 3, 1977. Id. She suffered injuries to her skull, presumably inflicted by a metal pipe recovered at the scene. Id. These wounds
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for this killing, Detective Ferranti administered the Miranda
warnings to him.' Although he was unable to obtain a statement
from Burbine, Detective Ferranti subsequently obtained statements from both DiOrio and Sparks that connected Burbine to
the Providence killing. " Detective Ferranti subsequently contacted the Providence police and conveyed the incriminating information to them. 12 At approximately 7:00 p.m., three
Providence officers arrived at the Cranston headquarters and met
briefly with Detective Ferranti before questioning Sparks and

DiOrio. '3
Shortly thereafter, Burbine's sister telephoned the Office of
the Public Defender in an attempt to contact Richard Casparian,
an attorney who had represented Burbine on a previous unrelated charge.' 4 Burbine's sister, unaware that her brother was
suspected of murder, sought to obtain representation for him regarding the breaking and entering charge.' 5 The attorney who
received her call was unsuccessful in reaching Mr. Casparian but
contacted another public defender, Allegra Munson.' 6 Ms. Munson telephoned the Cranston police detective division at about
8:15 p.m.,' 7 and stated that she would be available to represent
Burbine should the police wish to interrogate him or place him in
a lineup.' 8 An unidentified person told her that the police officers had finished questioning Burbine for the evening.' 9
Later that evening, the police led Burbine into an interrogaresulted in her death three weeks later. Id. Detective Ferranti had been told that
the person responsible for Ms. Hickey's murder was known as "Butch" and subsequently learned that Burbine used that nickname. Id.
10 Id. at 1138.
''

Id.

Id.
Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178, 180 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1135
(1986).
14 Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1139.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 23 (R.I. 1982), petitionfor habeas corpus denied sub
nom. Burbine v. Moran, 589 F. Supp. 1245 (D.R.I. 1984), rev'd, 753 F.2d 178 (1st
Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986). Justice Stevens pointed out that at the
time Ms. Munson's call was received at the Cranston station, both the Cranston and
Providence police were questioning Sparks and DiOrio about Burbine's involvement in the Hickey murder. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1154 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18 Burbine, 451 A.2d at 23-24.
19 Id. at 24. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island summarized that conversation
as follows:
The unidentified person told Ms. Munson that the police would not be
questioning Burbine or putting him in a lineup and that they were
through with him for the night. Ms. Munson was not informed that the
12
13
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tion room, again advised him of his rights, and proceeded to
question him about the murder.20 Burbine remained unaware of
both his sister's attempt to 2obtain counsel and Ms. Munson's
Burbine denied involvement in
conversation with the police.
the crime and was returned to another holding room. 22 Approximately ten minutes later, Burbine summoned the police and explained that he wished to make a statement. 23 After executing a
written waiver of his rights, Burbine signed a four page statement
in which he confessed to the murder. 24 Burbine was again advised of his rights and he signed a second statement.2 5 Burbine
then signed a third inculpatory statement at approximately noon
the following day.26
Burbine brought a pre-trial motion to suppress his confessions, contending that the statements were obtained in violation
of his privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel.27
Noting that the Miranda warnings were explained to Burbine and
that he had "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
privilege[s] ...

"

the trial judge refused to exclude the confes-

sions. 28 In addition, the trial court viewed Burbine's right to request an attorney as personal and concluded that his attorney
Providence police were at the Cranston police station or that Burbine
was a suspect in [Hickey's] murder.
Id.

Burbine, 753 F.2d at 180.
Id.
Id. Although Burbine had at least two chances to use a telephone, he apparently did not avail himself of the opportunity. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1139 (citing
Transcript of Suppression Hearing 23, 85). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens observed that the state court record contained no finding that Burbine in fact
had access to a phone. Id. at 1154 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
added that no evidence on the record indicated whether the police had made an
outside phone line available or whether Burbine knew that he could use a phone.
Id.
23 Burbine, 753 F.2d at 180. Justice Stevens questioned the Supreme Court's assumption that Burbine initiated this conversation with the police. Burbine, 106 S.
Ct. at 1155 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens pointed out that the state court
had made no such finding and that the police officers' testimony regarding
Burbine's initiation of the conversation was inconsistent. Id.
24 Burbine, 753 F.2d at 180-81.
25 Id. at 181.
26 Id.
27 Burbine, 106 S.Ct. at 1139. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial. . .and have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]." See generally
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel incorporated into state
criminal prosecutions); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (defendants have
right to retained or appointed counsel in federal criminal prosecutions).
28 State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 24 (R.I. 1982), petitionfor habeas corpus denied sub
20
21
22
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could not assert that right.2 9 The case was subsequently tried
before a jury, and Burbine was convicted of first degree
murder. °
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, a divided
3
court rejected Burbine's fifth and fourteenth amendment '
claims and affirmed the conviction. 2 The state supreme court
repudiated Burbine's contention that he was unable to judi-

ciously waive his rights without the knowledge that an attorney
had attempted to contact him." The court also denounced the

proposition that questioning a suspect must cease once an attorney requests that interrogation only proceed with the attorney
present.3 4
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode
3 5

Island denied Burbine's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed Burbine's conviction. 36 The court stated that Burbine's
waiver of his fifth and sixth amendment rights was tainted by the

police officers' irresponsibility in failing to inform him that an
attorney had called.3 7 In reversing the district court, the First
Circuit also considered the police officers' misrepresentation to
the attorney that Burbine would not be subject to further interronom. Burbine v. Moran, 589 F. Supp. 1245 (D.R.I. 1984), rev'd, 753 F.2d 178 (1st
Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
29 Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1139.
30 Id. at 1140.
31 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 provides in part that no state "shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Due process requires reversal of any conviction resulting from police conduct that "shocks the
conscience" or "offend[s] a sense ofjustice." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
172-73 (1952).
32 Burbine, 451 A.2d at 31.
33 Id. at 29.
34 Id.
35 Burbine v. Moran, 589 F. Supp. 1245 (D.R.I. 1984), rev'd, 753 F.2d 178 (1st
Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986). The writ of habeas corpus is designed to
provide a "prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963). In Fay, the Supreme
Court stated that, "in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to
the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to
conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his
immediate release." Id. at 402.
In denying Burbine's petition for habeas corpus, the district court considered
his fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendment arguments and concluded that no constitutional violations had occurred. Burbine, 589 F. Supp. at 1253-54.
36 Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178, 187-88 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1135
(1986).
37 Id. at 184-85.
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gation until the following day.38
The United States Supreme Court granted the government's
petition for certiorari 39 to decide whether a misrepresentation to
an attorney seeking information regarding a suspect, or the failure to inform a suspect of an attorney's attempt to contact him,
should result in the suppression of an otherwise valid pre-arraignment confession.40 In reversing the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court held that a suspect's ability to intelligently waive
his constitutional rights was not affected by incidents occurring
outside of his presence and unknown to him.4 The Court further recognized that Miranda warnings are designed to protect
the suspect's fifth and sixth amendment rights and that any misinformation conveyed to an attorney is, therefore, irrelevant to a
fifth amendment analysis. 42 The majority rejected Burbine's
claim that a criminal suspect's right to counsel attaches once a
relationship with an attorney is established.43 Accordingly, the
Court emphasized that sixth amendment rights are triggered
only after the defendant is formally charged.44 Finally, the Court
was unconvinced that the police department's misconduct rose to
the level of a fourteenth amendment due process violation.45
Early common law courts viewed a defendant's confession
admissible at trial without regard to the methods used in procuring the statement. 46 By the late nineteenth century, however, the
United States Supreme Court recognized that confessions obtained under circumstances which affected their reliability could
be excluded.47 Confessions made in response to inducements,
threats, or promises by one in an authoritative position were
deemed involuntary and, consequently, unreliable.48
Id. at 185.
Moran v. Burbine, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985).
Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1140.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1143.
43 Id. at 1145.
44 Id. at 1146.
45 Id. at 1147-48.
46 See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REV. 935
(1966) [hereinafter Confessions] (discussing the applicability of suspect's fifth amendment rights during police questioning); Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on
Police Interrogation, 25 OHIo ST. L.J. 449, 452-58 (1964) (discussing development of
confession law prior to Miranda).
47 See Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622-23 (1896); Pierce v. United
States, 160 U.S. 355, 357 (1896); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895);
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1884).
48 Hopt, 110 U.S. at 585.
38

39
40
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In 1897, the Supreme Court, in Bram v. United States,4 9 utilized the fifth amendment's bar against self-incrimination to exclude a confession in federal court. 50 In Bram, the Court
combined fifth amendment scrutiny with the voluntariness approach traditionally used at common law. 5' The Bram decision
thus initiated an expansion of the common law exclusionary
rule.5 2 Rather than focusing only on the statement's reliability,
federal courts began to inquire into whether a confession was
truly voluntary.5 3 Eventually, the voluntariness approach was superseded by the adoption of rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 54 which requires that an arrested person be
55
brought before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay.
The Supreme Court enforced this requirement through the McNabb-Mallory rule, 5 6 which mandated the exclusion of confessions
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
Id. at 542-44.
51 Id. Writing for the Court, Justice White stated that:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question
arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the
issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment .. , commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."
Id. at 542.
52 See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 264-65 (1985) [hereinafter
W. LAFAVE AND J. ISRAEL]; Note, The Soap Box Exception to the Miranda Rule: Fifth
Amendment Protections Slip Down the Drain, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 685 (1985) (discussing development of confession law through Quarles v. New York, 105 S. Ct.
2626 (1984)).
53 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52, at 264-65 (quoting Ziang Sung Wan v.
United States, 266 U.S. 1, 55 (1924)). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
462 (1966) (quoting Ziang Sung Wan) (describing requirements of voluntary
confession).
54 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
55 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463.
56 See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943). In McNabb, several bootleggers were arrested late at night in
connection with the murder of a federal revenue agent. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 334.
Federal authorities did not bring the defendants before a judicial officer, but nonetheless questioned them for several days before they confessed. Id. at 335-38. The
Court held that the defendants' confessions were inadmissible because they were
procured through improper law enforcement procedures. Id. at 345-47.
In Mallory, a rape suspect was arrested at about 2:30 p.m. and intermittently
questioned until approximately 9:30 p.m., at which time he confessed. Mallory, 354
U.S. at 450-51. The defendant was not arraigned before a magistrate until the following morning. Id. at 451. Noting the ease with which the police could have provided for arraignment prior to questioning the defendant, the Court held the
confessions inadmissible. Id. at 455-56. See also Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory
Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1 (1958) (providing detailed analysis
of McNabb-Mallory rule).
49
50
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produced during a period of unnecessarily long detention.57
The United States Supreme Court also held a coerced confession inadmissible in the case of Brown v. Mississippi.58 Significantly, this was the first case in which the Court used the
fourteenth amendment due process clause to hold a confession
in state court inadmissible.59 In Brown, a police deputy, together
with a mob of white men, whipped and tortured three black defendants until they confessed to the details of a murder as narrated by the mob.60 The Court recognized that the state action
involved in acquiring a conviction was subject to the standards of
the fourteenth amendment due process clause and that due process was violated when a state compelled a confession. 6 '
In later cases involving potential fourteenth amendment violations, the Supreme Court evaluated the "totality of the circumstances" in which a confession was made.6 2 This analysis
required consideration of factors such as the conditions and
length of custody, the suspect's mental state and physical condition, the officer's conduct toward the suspect, and any other factors that might affect the suspect's ability to resist police
pressure.6 3 If such factors were deemed to have influenced the
suspect's decision to confess to a crime, the confession was held
to be involuntary and thus inadmissible. 6 The Supreme Court
has recognized, therefore, that the fourteenth amendment due
process standard was intended not only to ensure the voluntariness of confessions but also to deter police misconduct. 65
57 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966) (citing Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)).
58 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
59 See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52, at 265.
60 Brown, 297 U.S. at 281.
61 Id. at 286. The fifth amendment was not applicable in state court confession
cases until 1964. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
62 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-15 (1963) (scrutinizing voluntariness of confession by examination of all attendant circumstances); Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961) (outlining factors to be considered in
totality of circumstance scrutiny).
63 See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602.
64 See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
65 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). See also Lynumn, 372 U.S. at
528 (police told defendant she would lose welfare benefits and child custody if she
failed to cooperate); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (police officer, a long
time acquaintance of defendant, told defendant his police position would be jeopardized if defendant refused to talk); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)
(police interrogated defendant for 36 hours).
The due process voluntariness standard was criticized on several grounds: the
impreciseness of the term "voluntary" left the police with little guidance concern-
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In the 1959 case of Spano v. New York, 66 the Supreme Court
recognized that a defendant's access to counsel was an important
factor to be taken into account when analyzing the circumstances
surrounding a confession.6 7 In Spano, a defendant charged with
murder was continuously interrogated despite his repeated requests to have his attorney present.68 In addition, the police directed officer Bruno, a close friend of the defendant, to try to
elicit a confession from him.69 After several questioning sessions, in which Bruno used false inducements, defendant Spano
finally agreed to make a statement. 70 This statement was instrumental in obtaining his conviction. 7 ' Although the defendant's
conviction was reversed on fourteenth amendment grounds,7 2
four justices concurred in opinions that specifically addressed the
officers' failure to honor the defendant's requests for counsel.73
In one concurring opinion, Justice Douglas stated that when a
person formally charged with a crime is deprived of counsel prior
to trial, the results may be more detrimental than denial of representation during trial.74 Justice Stewart, in a separate concurring
opinion, stated that the police officers' failure to provide the defendant with counsel was sufficient to bar admissibility of the
confession under the fourteenth amendment.7 5
Five years after Spano, the Court departed from its traditional scrutiny of the "totality of the circumstances" test under
the fourteenth amendment in Massiah v. United States. 76 In Massiah, federal narcotics agents obtained inculpatory statements
from the defendant subsequent to his indictment and in the absence of counsel. 7 7 Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart deing interrogation procedure; the standard was ambiguous and not amenable to easy
judicial review; and it provided insufficient defendant protection and resulted in
courtroom "swearing contests." See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 52, at 26869.
66 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
67 Id. at 325 (Douglas, J., concurring).
68 Id. at 318.
69 Id. at 318-19.
70 Id. at 319. Officer Bruno falsely told the defendant that he (Bruno) was in a
great deal of trouble with his supervisors because of a telephone call the defendant
had made to him. Id. Bruno added that the situation could result in Bruno losing
his job causing severe detriment to his family. Id. at 323.
71 Id. at 319-20.
72 Id. at 323-24.
73 Id. at 324 (Douglas, J., concurring), 326 (Stewart, J., concurring).
74 Id. at 325 (Douglas, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 326 (Stewart, J., concurring).
76 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
77 Id. at 204.
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clared that the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel was
violated when incriminating post indictment statements were
elicited from him without counsel present.78 Justice Stewart
viewed the indictment as the critical point at which the defendant's right to an attorney ripened. 79
Later that year, in Escobedo v. Illinois, ° the Supreme Court
stated that the right to counsel was triggered pre-indictment,
once the police focused their investigation upon a particular defendant.8" In Escobedo, the defendant was taken into custody and
questioned about the murder of his brother-in-law.82 Although
the defendant's attorney was present at the station house, the police would not permit him to communicate with the defendant
until the interrogation was completed. 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Goldberg could find no meaningful distinction between a defendant's need for counsel before or after
indictment.8 4 Justice Goldberg recognized that once a police investigation was directed at a particular defendant, a true adversarial atmosphere was created in which a defendant had a right to
consult with his attorney.8 5 Although Escobedo presented a
unique factual situation, it appeared that the Court was heading
toward a general station house right to counsel.8 6
In 1966, however, the Supreme Court renewed its reliance
on the fifth amendment to determine the admissibility of confes87
sions offered in state court prosecutions in Miranda v. Arizona.
Id. at 204-06.
Id. at 204.
80 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
81 Id. at 492.
82 Id. at 479.
83 Id. at 480-81. During the course of interrogation, the police told Escobedo
that a codefendant had blamed him for the murder. Id. at 482. In a subsequent
confrontation with the codefendant, Escobedo made a statement that indicated his
complicity in the killing. Id. at 483.
84 Id. at 485. Justice Goldberg stated that "[i]t would exalt form over substance
to make the right to counsel ... depend on whether at the time of the interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal indictment." Id. at 486.
85 Id. at 492.
86 W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 52, at 274. In holding that Escobedo was
denied assistance of counsel, the Court noted that the investigation had focused on
Escobedo, that he was in police custody, that he had requested access to his attorney, and that the police had not informed him of his right to remain silent. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 491.
87 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). Miranda was a compilation of four cases in which
statements were obtained from defendants during a period of custodial interrogation: Miranda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, and
California v. Stewart. See id. at 456-57.
78
79
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The Miranda Court examined the admissibility of statements obtained during police custodial interrogation and formulated procedural safeguards designed to protect a suspect's privilege
against self-incrimination.8 In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, the Court stated that custodial interrogation created "inherently compelling pressures" which may force an individual to
speak when he otherwise would not. 9 In order to dispel those
pressures, the Court enunciated procedural safeguards for
mandatory implementation in all police dominated custodial interrogations. 9° The Court also stated that the prosecution would
be precluded, from using statements obtained from a defendant
unless he was informed of his constitutional rights prior to questioning. 9 ' Finally, the majority pointed out that once warned, the
suspect could choose to waive his rights if the waiver was made
"voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.' '92
After the Miranda decision, it remained unclear whether the
police were forever barred from questioning a suspect once he
had invoked his fifth amendment rights. 93 In Michigan v. Mosley, 94
the Supreme Court held that the admissibility of a suspect's statement depended upon whether his Miranda right to terminate
questioning was scrupulously honored.9 5 In Mosley, the defendant was arrested in connection with two local robberies.9 6 After
being fully advised of his Miranda rights, Mosley indicated to the
arresting officer that he did not wish to answer any questions
88 See id. at 439.
89 Id. at 467.
90 Id. at 444-45. See also supra note 3 for summary of warnings read to a defend-

ant prior to custodial interrogation. The Court also defined custodial interrogation
as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. In a subsequent decision, the Court later explained that
express questioning or its functional equivalent constituted interrogation under
Miranda. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
91 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
92 Id. at 444. A waiver is deemed "knowingly and intelligently" made when a
suspect is fully cognizant of the nature of his rights and the ramifications of relinquishing those rights. SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938).
93 See generally W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 52, at 312-14 (discussing validity of waiver subsequent to invocation of rights).
94 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
95 Id. at 103-04. Quoting Miranda, the Mosley Court noted that "[o]nce warnings
have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in
any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease." Id. at 100 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 47374).
96 Id. at 97.
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concerning the robberies.9 7 A few hours later, Mosley was approached by a different officer who sought to question him about
an unrelated murder.9 8 After a second set of Miranda warnings,
Mosley made a statement that implicated him in the murder. 99 In
determining whether the police had abided by Miranda's guidelines, the Court asserted that the suspect's right to terminate interrogation mitigated any compulsion inherent in the custodial
setting.'0 o In their view, Mosley's rights were strictly honored: he
was fully apprised of his rights prior to questioning; his request
to suspend interrogation was immediately respected; and the second interrogation in no way undercut his decision not to answer
questions regarding the robberies."'
In a case similar to Mosley, the Court decided on the admissibility of a statement made by a defendant after he had expressly
0 2
invoked his right to have counsel present during questioning.1
0
3
In Edwards v. Arizona,' decided in 1981, the defendant indicated
his interest in arranging a plea negotiation, but stated that he
wanted counsel present before speaking with the prosecutor.'0 4
The next morning, a detention officer told the defendant that he
had to speak with the police. 10 5 Consequently, the defendant
0 6
made an incriminating statement without his attorney present.1
In holding the defendant's confession inadmissible, the Court
was unpersuaded by the state's argument that the defendant had
waived his right to counsel once he responded to further interrogation. 0 7 The Court stated that when an accused manifests his
desire to have counsel present, additional safeguards are neces97 Id.
98 Id.

at 98.

99 Id.
100

Id. at 104.

101 Id. at 104-05. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan described the major-

ity's decision as a step in the erosion of Miranda'sprinciples. Id. at 112 (Brennan,J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan was unconvinced that a suspect's ability to control the
timing of questioning dissipated the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation. Id. at 115 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan thus favored a rule which
would require that either the suspect be arraigned or, alternatively, be provided
counsel before questioning is resumed. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 478 (1981).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 479.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 484-85. Reiterating its previous decisions, the Court stated that "waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and
intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.
Id.
at 482 (citations omitted).
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sary.' 0 8 Writing for the Court, Justice White asserted that the
accused cannot be interrogated further until either counsel is
made available or the accused himself initiates a discussion with
the authorities. 10 9
Two years after the Edwards decision, the Supreme Court announced a two-stage test of admissibility in Oregon v. Bradshaw."'
The defendant in Bradshaw was suspected of involvement in a
traffic accident that resulted in the death of a minor."' After being advised of his rights, the defendant was questioned about the
circumstances surrounding the accident." 2 Although the defendant denied involvement in the crash, he admitted that he had
furnished liquor to the minor and as a result was arrested." 3
The defendant requested counsel at which point all questioning
ceased." 4 While en route to the jail, the defendant inquired as to
what procedures would follow." 5 In the ensuing conversation,
the defendant agreed to submit to a polygraph examination in
which he ultimately confessed that he had been the driver of the
vehicle that had crashed." 6 The Court explained that a statement made by a defendant who had previously asserted his right
to counsel was admissible only when the defendant initiated further discussions with the authorities and, according to the "totality of the circumstances" test, the defendant's waiver was
"knowingly and intelligently" made." 7 The Court concluded
Id. at 484-85.
109 Id. The Court noted that had the defendant initiated the conversation with
the police, nothing would have prevented the police from listening to the defendant's volunteered statements. Id. at 485. See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291 (1980) (defendant invoked right to counsel but subsequently initiated conversation with police and volunteered incriminating information).
One author notes that the holding in Edwards limits Mosley's rationale to those
cases in which the defendant has indicated his desire to remain silent, but has not
requested the presence of an attorney. See W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 52, at
314.
110 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
111 Id. at 1041. The body of a young boy was discovered in a pickup truck that
had left the road and struck a tree. Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1041-42.
115 Id. at 1042. The officer explained to the defendant that he was under no obligation to speak unless he so desired; the defendant responded that he understood.
Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1045-46. In determining the validity of a waiver according to the "totality of the circumstances" test, the Court considers the "particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience and conduct of
the accused." North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1979) (quoting
108
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that the defendant, while fully aware of his fifth and sixth amendment rights, had initiated discussions with the police and that the
subsequent statements made by him to the polygraph
examiner
18
rights."
his
of
wavier
valid
a
of
product
the
were
It was against this backdrop that the Court decided Moran v.
Burbine." 9 In that case, the Court employed Bradshaw's rationale
in examining Burbine's assertion that a knowledgeable waiver of
fifth amendment rights was not possible absent the information
that an attorney had attempted to contact him. 120 Writing for the
majority, 21 Justice O'Connor stated that a suspect's ignorance of
events occurring outside his presence has no effect upon his ability to knowingly abandon constitutional safeguards. 12 2 Justice

O'Connor thought it anomalous that a defendant in Burbine's
situation would have validly waived his rights had an attorney not
called the police station. 123 As further evidence that the defendant had made a valid waiver, Justice O'Connor observed that the
defendant had initiated the conversation in which he
confessed.

1 24

The majority also addressed the First Circuit's conclusion
that the police had acted recklessly and irresponsibly in misleading an attorney and in failing to inform Burbine that an attorney
had tried to contact him. 125 Justice O'Connor stated that police
misconduct is irrelevant to a suspect's decision to waive his
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937)). See also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S.
707, 725 (1979) (totality of circumstances approach used to determine validity of
waiver in juvenile case).
118 Id. at 1046. In a dissenting opinion,Justice Marshall,joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the defendant had initiated further communications with the police. Id. at 1053
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that the question posed by the
defendant was not the kind of initiation contemplated by the Edwards Court. Id. at
1055 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall believed that the defendant's question could be expected under the circumstances and that "[t]o allow the authorities
to recommence an interrogation based on such a question is to permit them to
capitalize on the custodial setting." Id. at 1056 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119 106 S. Ct. 1135.
120 Id. at 1141.
121 Id. at 1138. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor in the majority opinion. Id. Justice Stevens
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. Id.
122 Id. at 1141-42. The Court stated that the Constitution does not "require that
the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self
interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights." Id. at 1142 (citations
omitted).
123 Id. at 1141-42.
124 Id. at 1141 (citing Burbine v. Moran, 453 F.2d 178, 180 (1st Cir. 1985)).
125 Id. at 1142-43.
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rights, unless such misconduct actually deprives the suspect 2of6
information necessary to an understanding of those rights.

Justice O'Connor further reasoned that the Miranda warnings are
not rights, but merely a prophylaxis against self-incrimination
and that any reversal based upon a police department's deception of an attorney would constitute an unjustifiable expansion of
the Miranda decision. 27 The Court observed that Miranda accurately balances society's interest in law enforcement against the
protection of a suspect's rights.' 28 The Burbine Court was unwilling to disturb this balance by mandating a rule that would require the police to inform a suspect of an attorney's attempt to
contact him. 129 In the Court's view, the adoption of such a rule
would have the effect
of "muddying Miranda's otherwise rela1 30
tively clear waters."

Justice O'Connor next examined Burbine's theory that the
sixth amendment protects an attorney-client relationship at the
moment that relationship is formed, or alternatively, once custodial interrogation commences. 1 3' The majority agreed that absent a waiver, a defendant has a right to a lawyer at
questioning. 32 The Court pointed out, however, that this right
vests in a defendant only after the initiation of adverstarial proceedings.13 The Court noted that in the instant case, the quesId.
Id. at 1143 (citing Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 (1976)).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1144. The Court noted that confessions are essential to effective law
enforcement, but also recognized that the coerciveness inherent in the interrogation process must be tempered by constitutional safeguards. Id. The Court stated
that construing Miranda as a mandate, by requiring police to inform a suspect of
counsel's attempts to contact him, would marginally add to a defendant's constitutional protection while significantly hampering society's interest in law enforcement. Id.
130 Id. at 1143. The Court expressed concern that the legal questions raised in
enforcing such a police disclosure rule would be unmanageable. Id.
131 Id. at 1145-47. Relying on dicta in Escobedo, Burbine argued that custodial
interrogation is the point at which suspects often proffer the most damaging information; therefore, the need to protect the attorney-client privilege is paramount.
Id.
132 Id. at 1145.
'33 Id. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). The "initiation of adversarial
judicial proceedings" is the point at which the government becomes formally obligated to prosecute a defendant; for example, arraignment, preliminary hearing, information, or indictment. Id. at 689. See also Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477
(1985) (conviction based on statements received from defendant post-indictment
and without counsel present reversed on sixth amendment grounds); United States
v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984) (inmates suspected of murdering convict were not
entitled to counsel until initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings).
126
127
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tioning session in which Burbine confessed took place prior to
formal charging. 3 4 Rejecting Burbine's proposed interpretation
of the sixth amendment, the majority stated that the point at
which the right to counsel attaches should not be contingent
upon whether a suspect, or his family, obtained counsel prior to
questioning.' 35 The Court emphasized that the sixth amendment's function is to assist a defendant facing prosecution by an
organized society rather than to protect the attorney-client privilege. ' 36 Although it recognized that the results of custodial interrogation may drastically affect the outcome of a trial, the Court
nonetheless concluded that any potential harmful effects were in37
sufficient to trigger sixth amendment rights.
In rejecting Burbine's final contention that the behavior of
the police deprived him of his fourteenth amendment due process rights, the Court stated that the police officers' conduct sub
judice fell "short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the
sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion
into the criminal processes of the States." 138 The Court implied,
however, that if the officers' conduct had been more egregious
than evidenced by the facts presented,
a due process violation
19
may well have been recognized.

In a lengthy dissent, Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan
strongly criticized the majority for misinterpreting the scope of
the Miranda decision and ignoring the well-settled principles of
an entire body of case law.' 4 0 Writing for the dissent,Justice Ste134 Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1145.
135 Id. at 1146. The Burbine Court stated that Escobedo was not intended to justify
a broad reading of the sixth amendment, but merely intended " 'to guarantee full
effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination ..
Id. at 1145-46 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
136 Id. at 1146 (citing Moulton, 106 S.Ct. at 484).
137 Id. at 1147.
138 Id. at 1147-48.
139 Id. at 1147.
140 See id. at 1148-50 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Citing a variety of state court decisions, Justice Stevens pointed out that a majority of those decisions have excluded
statements obtained when police had interfered with an attorney's attempts to establish communications with a suspect. Id. at 1151 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens further noted that the Court's holding violated the American Bar
Association's Standards for Criminal Justice. Id. at 1151-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting). These Standards provide that:
A person taken into custody or otherwise deprived of liberty should
immediately be warned of the right to assistance from a lawyer. This
warning should be followed at the earliest opportunity by a formal offer
of counsel .... At the earliest opportunity a person in custody should
be effectively placed in communication with a lawyer. There should be
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vens claimed that the majority's holding would elevate incommunicado questioning to "a societal goal of the highest order that
justifies police deception of the shabbiest kind."' 14 ' Moreover,
Justice Stevens asserted that the majority's adoption of an exceedingly strict construction of the fifth and sixth amendments
was an attempt to justify its disregard of the fact that the police
deceived an attorney. 142 Analogizing the attorney-client relationship to that of a principal and agent, Justice Stevens reasoned
that the deception of an attorney is tantamount to the deception
of his client. 1 43 Reviewing the officers' failure to inform Burbine
of an attorney's attempt to contact him, Justice Stevens reiterated
Miranda'sprohibition against the government's use of trickery, "44
and stated that 5the officers' conduct could not be constitutionally
4
distinguished. 1

Renouncing the majority's abbreviated analysis regarding
the validity of waivers,146 Justice Stevens emphasized that a
strong presumption exists against the waiver of constitutional
rights and noted that the government bears the burden of dispelprovided for this purpose access to a telephone, the telephone number
of the defender or assigned counsel program, and any other means necessary to establish communication with a lawyer.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 5-71 (2d ed. 1986).
The ABA states that a reading of Miranda warnings does not satisfy the requirement for a formal offer of counsel. Id., commentary at § 5.71. To ensure that an
offer of counsel is stated clearly and fairly, the ABA further recommends that such
an offer be made by a defense attorney rather than a police officer or prosecutor.
See id. at § 5.70.
141 Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1151 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that
the majority's reasoning "flies in the face of this Court's repeated expressions of
deep concern about incommunicado questioning." Id. at 1150 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
142 Id. at 1163 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Contrary to the majority's findings that
police deception is irrelevant to fifth or sixth amendment rights, Justice Stevens
believed that misinformation which prevented a suspect's access to counsel during
interrogation had a direct bearing on the effectuation of those rights. Id.
'43 Id. at 1163 n.49 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 405 (1977)).
144 Id. at 1158 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476). The
Miranda Court stated that "any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked,
or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily
waive his privilege." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
145 See Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 1157 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing id at 1142). Justice Stevens criticized the majority's analysis, which would validate a waiver once it is established
that " 'asuspect's decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all
times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the
state's intention to secure a conviction.' " Id. (quoting id. at 1142).
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ling that presumption. 47 Accordingly, Justice Stevens favored
invalidation of any waiver obtained from a suspect after an officer
failed to convey information concerning an attorney's
communication. 148

Justice Stevens criticized the way in which the majority balanced society's interests against an individual's constitutional
rights.' 4 9 The dissent also recognized the temptation for society
to overlook constitutional safeguards when it appears that a suspect is guilty of a crime.' 50 Relying on landmark Supreme Court
precedent, Justice Stevens stressed that society's interest in obtaining confessions has repeatedly been held subordinate to Miranda's goal of reducing the coerciveness present in custodial
interrogations.' 5 ' Justice Stevens, therefore, restated the principle that "ours is an accusatorial, not inquisitorial, system"' 5 2 and
concluded that the fear that a suspect will exercise his rights is
53
insufficient to justify repression of those rights.
Addressing the majority's concern of maintaining the clarity
of the Miranda rules, the dissent pointed out that the states have
experienced little difficulty in applying a police disclosure rule. 154
Justice Stevens characterized the majority's concern as one-sided
and explained that the Miranda rules are designed primarily to
provide direction not to the police, but to a suspect who is en55
ticed to waive his rights.'

With regard to Burbine's fourteenth amendment due process claim, Justice Stevens advocated an analysis less stringent
than the traditional "shock the conscience" test espoused by the
majority.' 56 Believing that due process requires "fairness, integ147 Id. at 1157 n.32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404 and
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475).
148 Id. at 1158 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens supported his position by
referring to Miranda, which invalidated waivers obtained in the absence of the required warnings. Id. at 1157-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149 See id. at 1160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15o Id.
15' Id. at 1160-62 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200 (1979); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964)). Justice Stevens noted that in cases in which an individual's liberty was
jeopardized by incommunicado interrogation, the Supreme Court has employed
special procedures to limit the coercive effects of the interrogation and thus protect
the individual's liberty. See id. at 1162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 1161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153 Id.
154 See id. at 1162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 Id.
156 See id. at 1165 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rity, and honor in the operation of the criminal justice system," 157 Justice Stevens concluded that the police officers'
conduct in the case at bar was demonstrative of exactly the con158
duct prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.
In conclusion, Justice Stevens stated that this case required a
determination of an attorney's true role in our society. 59 Justice
Stevens opined that if society views the attorney as an obstacle to
the apprehension of criminals, only then would the majority's decision make sense.' 6 ° If society views the attorney as an interpreter and protector of constitutional rights, however, Justice
Stevens posited that the majority opinion would be
anomalous. 161
Although Justice O'Connor's use of Supreme Court precedent is convincing, the majority seems to reach its decision much
too easily. The Burbine Court was satisfied that a waiver is voluntary once it is determined that the waiver was not coerced, the
defendant knew he could remain silent and have counsel present,
and was aware that his statements could be used against him at
trial.1 6 2 This narrow interpretation of the Miranda protections violates the very underpinnings upon which that decision is based.
The Miranda Court recognized that a suspect's fifth amendment
rights are paramount to society's interest in obtaining convictions and thus established procedural safeguards to protect the
suspect's interests. 16 3 These safeguards, however, were never intended to act to the exclusion of other constitutional protections
available to those suspected of criminal conduct. 64 The spirit of
Miranda demands that every reasonable precaution be exercised
to avoid the surrender of a statement under circumstances that
65
are inherently compelling. 1
By narrowly construing the language of Miranda, the Burbine
majority ignored the fact that the police wrongfully denied
157 Id.

Id. at 1165-66 (StevensJ., dissenting).
159 Id. at 1166 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158

160 Id.
161
162
163

text.

Id.
Id. at 1142.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. See also supra notes 87-93 and accompanying

164 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. The Miranda Court stated that "[o]ur decision in no
way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform.
Nor is it intended to have this effect." Id.
165 Id. The Miranda Court also "encourag[ed] Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of
the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws." Id.
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Burbine information required for a knowledgeable waiver. Despite Miranda's clear admonishment that any evidence of police
trickery would be fatal to the voluntariness of a suspect's
waiver,"' the Burbine majority has acknowledged that unethical
police conduct will be tolerated. To deny a suspect the opportunity to consult with an attorney prior to making a statement contravenes the multitude of Supreme Court decisions that have
disdained society's use of compelled confessions. 1 67 The majority's holding is also problematic in that it ignores both the criminal justice guidelines established by the American Bar
Association and the holdings of a majority of state courts that
have decided similar cases.' 6' As Justice Stevens queried in his
Burbine dissent, "one would expect at least some indication why
in the majority's view, so many state courts have been so pro16
foundly wrong on this precise issue." 1
Whether state courts will follow the United States Supreme
Court's lead in Burbine is questionable. The California Supreme
Court recently refused to adopt the Burbine holding in People v.
Houston. 170 Upon facts similar to those in Burbine,' 7 1 the Houston
Id. at 476. See also supra note 144 and accompanying text.
Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1150 (Stevens,J., dissenting). In support of this proposition, Justice Stevens cited a lengthy list of Supreme Court decisions reflecting the
Court's distrust of the validity of statements obtained through incommunicado
questioning. Id. at 1150 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Tague v. Louisiana,
444 U.S. 469, 470 (1980) (heavy burden on state in demonstrating valid waiver of
rights during incommunicado interrogation); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S.
341, 346 (1976) (police dominated atmosphere requires special safeguards during
incommunicado interrogation); Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349 (1968)
(confession deemed involuntary after lengthy incommunicado interrogation).
168 Burbine, 106 S.Ct. at 1150 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 140 and
accompanying text. The majority disregarded the holdings of the state courts by
merely stating that "our interpretive duties go well beyond deferring to the numerical preponderance of lower court decisions or to the subconstitutional recommendations of even so esteemed a body as the American Bar Association." Burbine, 106
S. Ct. at 1144. Professors LaFave and Israel have stated that a suspect clearly cannot "knowingly and intelligently" waive his right to counsel if the police have not
informed him that a lawyer, even if retained by a third party, has attempted to contact him. W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 52, at 309.
169 Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170 42 Cal. 3d 595, 610, 724 P.2d 1166, 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141, 149 (1986).
171 In Houston, the defendants were arrested and charged with drug related offenses. Id. at 600-01, 724 P.2d at 1168, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 143. Two friends contacted an attorney who agreed to represent the defendants. Id. at 601, 724 P.2d at
1168, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 143. The attorney telephoned the police station and requested that nothing further occur until he arrived. Id. When he arrived at the
station 20 minutes later, police informed the attorney that the defendants were being questioned and that he could not see them. Id. The defendants were never
informed of the attorney's attempts to intervene. Id.
166
167
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court came to the opposite conclusion. 7 2 Characterizing the
Burbine decision as a restrictive interpretation of the federal Conprovides its citistitution, the Houston court stated that California
73
zens more extensive individual rights.
While the Burbine majority conceded that more egregious
forms of police deception might violate a suspect's right to due
process, 174 the Court left unanswered the question of just how
much police deception will be tolerated. The effect of the majority's holding therefore remains unclear. It is uncertain whether
police departments that have previously regarded deception of a
suspect or attorney as improper will perceive this decision as allowing more latitude in police interrogation procedures. Accordingly, courts reviewing future cases will be left with little
guidance in determining when the police have crossed the line of
propriety. The Burbine decision evidences the Court's insensitivity to the fundamental protections guaranteed a suspect through
the Miranda decision. This insensitivity represents a significant
regression to the period when society's thirst for the conviction
and punishment of criminals overshadowed the desire to ensure
justice and fair treatment for all accused.
Alan W Clark
172 Id. at 610, 724 P.2d at 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 149. The California Supreme
Court held that "whether or not a suspect in custody has previously waived his
rights to silence and counsel, the police may not deny him the opportunity, before
questioning begins or resumes, to meet with his retained or appointed counsel who
has taken diligent steps to come to his aid." Id.
173 Id. at 609, 724 P.2d at 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 149. The court required the
state to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's confession was obtained before the attorney arrived at the station house. Id. at 614, 724 P.2d at 1177,
230 Cal. Rptr. at 152. The state was unable to meet this burden. Id.
174 Burbine, 106 S. Ct. at 1147.

